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BEING UIGHUR . . . WITH “CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS”: 
ANALYZING CHINA’S LEGAL CRUSADE AGAINST 
UIGHUR IDENTITY 
Brennan Davis* 
The Uighur peasants are very eager to take the road of co-
operation. . . . Some people claim[ed] that co-operation cannot 
succeed among the minority nationalities. This is not so.  
— Mao Zedong1 
Introduction (United Nations) 
In 2016, the Permanent Delegation of the People’s Republic of China to 
the United Nations celebrated the ten-year anniversary of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).2 The 
Declaration passed with overwhelming support in the General Assembly, 
and the People’s Republic joined 143 other states that voted in favor of the 
Declaration.3 Only four states voted against the resolution: Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.4 (All four of these states have 
since reversed their stances and have offered support of the Declaration.5) 
In commemorating the passing of the Declaration, Counsellor Yao stated 
“[n]ot all countries have indigenous peoples” and drew a distinction 
between “indigenous peoples [and] native people.”6 For indigenous peoples 
                                                                                                                 
 * Brennan Davis is a third-year law student at the University of Oklahoma College of 
Law, in 2016 he studied Chinese language and government at Peking University in Beijing. 
He has two bachelor’s degrees—one in International Relations with an emphasis on East 
Asia and the second in East Asian History. He also possesses a minor in Mandarin Chinese. 
 1. Mao Zedong, Editor’s Notes to Socialist Upsurge in China’s Countryside, in 5 
SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 242, 247 (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1977). 
 2. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted 
by the General Assembly in 2007. See G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007). 
 3. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNITED NATIONS: 
DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/ 
declaration-on-the-rights-of-indigenous-peoples.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2019).  
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Statement by Counsellor Yao Shaojun of the Chinese Delegation at the 15th Session 
of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, PERMANENT MISSION OF THE PEOPLE’S 
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to exist, as opposed to native peoples, Yao contended, there must be “a 
legacy [of a] colonial past.”7 As a result, he concluded, “China has no 
indigenous people.”8 Yao’s position reveals the inherent weaknesses of the 
Declaration—the ambiguity of the text. While the Declaration frequently 
invokes the term “indigenous peoples,” it at no point defines what 
communities the term is intended to apply to.9 It is in China’s interest to 
assert an intimate and intrinsic link between colonialism and indigenous 
peoples because China is not considered to have a colonial past.10 This 
definition, then, allows the Chinese to criticize countries with colonial 
legacies, most importantly the United States, for failing to treat native 
communities with the dignity they are owed while simultaneously being 
immune to such criticisms. This definition, which benefits China, seems to 
be accepted broadly as all the states that refused to approve the Declaration 
at the time of its adoption (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United 
States) share a colonial past. This suggests that these countries feared the 
Declaration would open them to unique attacks on the world stage and 
indicates that these states accept a definition of indigenous people similar to 
the one proposed by Counsellor Yao.11 In some cases, the dissenting votes 
were explicit in their feeling that the Declaration afforded rights too 
substantial to indigenous people within their borders, with New Zealand 
expressly stating that the Declaration was “fundamentally incompatible 
with New Zealand’s constitutional and legal arrangements . . . and the 
principle of governing for the good of all our citizens.”12 This suggests that 
                                                                                                                 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE UN (May 10, 2016), http://www.china-un.org/eng/gdxw/ 
t1363984.htm. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id.  
 9. See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 2.  
 10. See Colonialism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (rev. Aug. 29, 2017), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/colonialism/ (“[C]olonialism [is used] to describe the 
process of European settlement and political control over the rest of the world, including the 
Americas, Australia, and parts of Africa and Asia. . . . The term colonialism is frequently 
used to describe the settlement of North America, Australia, New Zealand, Algeria, and 
Brazil, places that were controlled by a large population of permanent European residents.”).  
 11. Id.  
 12. Naomi Solomon, Was the New Zealand Government Justified in Voting Against the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples?, 0 TE KĀHUI KURA MĀORI, no. 1, n.d., 
http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-Bid001Kahu-t1-g1-t4.html (quoting Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Explanation of Vote by HE Rosemary Banks, New 
Zealand Permanent Representative to the United Nations, N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. 
& TRADE (Sept. 13, 2007), https://web.archive.org/web/20090506090838/https://www.mfat. 
govt.nz/Media-and-publications/Media/MFAT-speeches/2007/0-13-September-2007.php0).  
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in the absence of a clear definition, the colonial-centric definition, which is 
advantageous for China, has carried the day and allowed the People’s 
Republic to assert that they do not have indigenous people; therefore, China 
is not bound by the Declaration’s principals. As a result, China can happily 
endorse the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples while 
simultaneously asserting that it is inapplicable to their own “native 
peoples,” of which there are many.  
Ethnic Diversity in China 
The People’s Republic of China is an incredibly diverse nation with 
fifty-six recognized minzu.13 These groups range from the widely known to 
the obscure, and the eleven historically recognized minority groups include 
“the Mongol, Hui, Tibetan, Uyghur, Miao, Yao, Yi, Korean, Manchu, Li, 
and Gaoshan (in Taiwan).”14 Despite this diversity, the Han ethnic group, 
who comprise over 90% of the country’s population, is the community 
Americans are most likely to envision as a “Chinese person.”15 Despite 
their superior numbers, the Han do not have a monopoly on meaningful 
historical and cultural contributions to the various Chinese states. In fact, 
many of the most memorable “Chinese” Dynasties have been founded, led, 
and ruled by non-Han people, including the Mongol Yuan Dynasty (1271–
1369) and the Manchu Great Qing Dynasty (1636–1912).16 However, the 
understanding of these nationalities has evolved over time and has 
accelerated during the modern era, featuring the end of the Great Qing, the 
Republican, and the Communist Periods. The Great Qing Dynasty saw the 
Chinese state expand to unprecedented levels and incorporated all of 
modern-day China, as well as areas which today belong to North Korea, 
Russia, and Vietnam, along with Mongolia and Taiwan in their entirety.17 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Minzu, 民族, is a combination of the words for “people” with the word “zu,” which 
refers to a group of people or things with shared features.  
 14. Wang Linzhu, The Identification of Minorities in China, 16 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y 
J., no. 2, 2015, at 1, 9; see id. at 9 n.37 (“‘Generally accepted minorities’ were groups that 
had been repeatedly mentioned in the Chinese Classic literatures or recorded during the 
Republican period. They were simply considered to ‘exist’ . . . .”) 
 15. THOMAS S. MULLANEY, COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NATION: ETHNIC 
CLASSIFICATION IN MODERN CHINA 1 (2011). 
 16. See John W. Dardess, From Mongol Empire to Yüan Dynasty: Changing Forms of 
Imperial Rule in Mongolia and Central Asia, 30 MONUMENTA SERICA 117 (1972–1973) 
(discussing the formation of the Mongol-led Yuan Dynasty); PAMELA K. CROSSLEY, THE 
MANCHUS 8 (1997) (discussing the Manchus and their eventual conquest of and rule over 
China). 
 17. See Qing Dynasty, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ 
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During this dynasty, which was governed by the foreign Manchu people, 
the government viewed China as a coalition of the Manchu—the 
leadership—and the Han—the manpower—who, together, ruled over 
several hundred distinct “barbarian” groups roaming the distant provinces.18  
This understanding shifted dramatically following the end of the Great 
Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic of China. The Great 
Qing collapsed in 1919, in part, because the Han were unwilling to continue 
being subjugated by the Manchu.19 Rather than go on accepting Manchu 
dominance, especially given the extensive defeats the Great Qing had 
suffered at the hands of Western governments, the Han rose up under the 
direction of Sun Yat-sen, the first President of China.20 Sun Yat-sen, after 
overthrowing the Great Qing, instituted a republican government that was 
built on his Three Principles—Nationalism, Democracy, and Livelihood.21 
President Sun’s first pillar of Nationalism was ethnic-nationalism and not 
patriotic-nationalism.22 He stated that “[d]uring the periods when [the 
Han’s] political and military prowess declined, they could not escape . . . 
from the fate of a conquered nation, but they could eventually vigorously 
reassert themselves.”23 Further, Sun declared his revolution against the 
                                                                                                                 
Qing-dynasty#ref331832 (last updated Oct. 11, 2019). 
 18. MULLANEY, supra note 15, at 1–2 (“Yunnan [was said to be] home to over one 
hundred distinct peoples, with nearly one hundred more in the neighboring province of 
Guizhou.”). 
 19. See John Stuart Thomson, The Genesis of the Republican Revolution in China from 
a South China Standpoint, 3 J. RACE DEV. 316, 320 (1913). 
 20. See id. at 320-21. Sun Yat-sen is an impressively popular figure in China and on 
both sides of the Taiwanese Straits. Both the Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist 
Party claim his legacy and both honor and acknowledge him to be the First President of 
China. See Agence France-Presse, Tug of War over China’s Founding Father Sun Yat-sen as 
Communist Party Celebrates His Legacy, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 10, 2016), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2044782/tug-war-over-chinas-
founding-father-sun-yat-sen. 
 21. Sun Yat-sen, Fundamentals of National Reconstruction (1923), in 2 SOURCES OF 
WORLD HISTORY 281, 282-83 (Mark A. Kishlansky ed., 1995). 
 22. There are two forms of nationalism recognized in history, here I refer to them as 
patriotic-nationalism and ethnic-nationalism. Both are ways of approaching the concept of a 
national identity. Patriotic-nationalism presumes all people within the political confines of a 
country are members of the national identity, regardless of their ethnic, racial, or religious 
origins. Ethnic-nationalism, however, is more limited. Ethnic-nationalists believe that the 
national identity is built on shared language, shared culture, and shared religion. These 
things, in harmony, form an ethnicity. See Jerry Z. Muller, Us and Them: The Enduring 
Power of Ethnic Nationalism, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 18, 20.  
 23. Id. at 282. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss1/4
No. 1] COMMENTS 85 
 
 
Manchu Great Qing Dynasty as a repetition of the earlier Han revolution 
against the Mongol Yuan Dynasty.24  
Despite the Manchu’s impressive nearly three-hundred-year reign over 
China, Sun was sincere in calling for reconciliation without doubting the 
righteousness of the revolution he had led. He stated that “[n]o vengeance 
has been inflicted on the Manchus and we have endeavored to live side by 
side with them on an equal footing. This is our nationalistic policy toward 
races within our national boundaries.”25 Despite Sun’s inclusive language, 
his ultimate message is clear—the Han have the right to rule China, 
including the areas populated by minorities. However, they ought not 
oppress the minorities living within China’s borders, for when minority 
groups gained the reins of government, it was only a matter of time before 
the yoke of minority governance over Han would be thrown off.26 Sun’s 
Nationalist Party, under the subsequent leadership of Jiang Jieshi, also 
insisted that there were not hundreds or even dozens of unique ethnic 
groups, and instead that “the country was home to only one people, ‘the 
Chinese people,’ and that the supposedly distinct groups of the republic 
were merely subvarieties of a common stock.”27 The Nationalist Party 
referred to this single ethnic group as zhonghua minzu, using the 
aforementioned minzu combined with zhonghua to mean China.28 This 
ideology was mirrored by the first flag of the Republic of China which was 
composed of five colored horizontal bars with one color representing one of 
the five recognized ethnic subvarieties—Han, Manchu, Mongol, Uighur,29 
and Tibetan.30 While it may seem contradictory to allege that there are not 
true distinctions between the Republic’s citizens and subsequently adopt a 
flag featuring those false distinctions, the Nationalists would contend that it 
was not the five colored bars that were of significance, but rather that they 
came together to form one flag—the Chinese flag.  
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. MULLANEY, supra note 15, at 2. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Technically, the Hui were represented. The Hui are a minority group in China who 
are predominately Muslim. However, “Hui” (回) at the time referred generally to Muslim 
people and, when the flag was created, referred to the Muslims in Western China, today the 
group we identify as Uighurs. It was not until later that Hui took on its modern meaning as 
referring to a specific ethnic group we now call the Hui, who are distinct from the Uighurs. 
See SUISHENG ZHAO, A NATION-STATE BY CONSTRUCTION: DYNAMICS OF MODERN CHINESE 
NATIONALISM 171 (2004).  
 30. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
86 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
 
 
The approach toward identifying and incorporating minorities shifted 
again following the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the Chinese 
Civil War. Initially, the newly established People’s Republic of China 
resolved to identify ethnic groups on the basis of self-identification.31 After 
all, the People’s Republic envisioned not a single unified Chinese race with 
various subdivisions, but rather, the notion of a multicultural, multinational 
union held together by its sincere belief in socialist principles.32 This 
proved to be overly idealistic and “[i]n the 1953 national census, over 400 
self-reported [ethnic] groups were recorded.”33 This was problematic not 
only because it was a towering figure which could not be easily reduced to 
autonomous provinces—similar to the Soviet model—but also because the 
Communist Party had reserved only 150 parliamentary seats for minority 
representatives.34 Such a number was intended to be “more than twice the 
number to which [ethnic minorities] would be entitled on a proportional 
basis.”35 
To resolve this discrepancy, the Communist Party assembled hundreds of 
ethnologists, linguists, historians, sociologists, and archaeologists to 
identify every minority group in the People’s Republic.36 This project later 
became known as the Ethnic Identification Project, which featured sending 
the assembled experts out into the countryside and having them identify 
minority groups, defined as “a historically constituted, stable community of 
people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, 
and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.”37 This 
definition was originally offered by Joseph Stalin and later adopted by the 
People’s Republic.38  
A simple two-question query determined a group’s status. First, was the 
group a minority population or were they Han?39 Second, if they were not 
Han, were they independent or a subsidiary of a larger group?40 Gradually, 
this inquiry resulted in the formation of the presently recognized fifty-six 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See Wang Linzhu, supra note 14, at 6.  
 32. See id. at 5.  
 33. Id. at 6. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 7 (quoting JOSEPH STALIN, MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 60 (Bruce 
Franklin ed., Croom Helm London 1973)). 
 38. Wang Linzhu, supra note 14, at 7. 
 39. Id. at 8. 
 40. Id. 
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minzu, the Han are included in that fifty-six.41 Whether you’re identified as 
a Han or a member of a minority minzu determines whether an individual 
has the ability to claim the minority rights guaranteed under the Chinese 
Constitution.42  
The history between the Han and the minority races is convoluted and 
complex, but consistently marked by Han feelings of superiority and a 
desire by the ruling government for the minorities either to stay out of 
China or, more recently, to cooperate for its betterment. During the 
Dynastic Period, minorities were often generalized as barbarians. During 
the Republican Period, minorities were urged to embrace their intrinsic 
Chinese characteristics, and during the Communist Period minorities were 
identified, registered, and instructed to work together for the advancement 
of the socialist state.43 Because the definition proposed by Counsellor Yao 
in his comments on the anniversary of the adoption of the United Nations’ 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples tying indigenous people to 
colonial history—and drawing a distinction between indigenous peoples 
and native peoples—the People’s Republic has been able to simultaneously 
embrace documents like the Declaration, while also treating their own 
indigenous populations as they wish. Too, that treatment can be quite 
severe. 
For instance, the hostile actions of the People’s Republic toward 
indigenous populations in Tibet are widely known of in the United States. 
Tibet is a province of China located in the rugged terrain of the Himalayan 
Mountains.44 Tibetans are a distinct ethnic group from the Han.45 Tibet was 
annexed into the People’s Republic of China in 1950 following a Chinese 
invasion of the then-independent nation.46 The conflict ended with a treaty 
recognizing Chinese governance in Tibet known as the Seventeen Point 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See id. at 9 (“By 1954 . . . thirty-eight groups received official recognition. . . . [I]n 
the 1964 census . . . another fifteen minorities [were added to] the so-called ‘family of 
nationalities.’”) The process was eventually completed in the 1980s. 
 42. Id. at 13.  
 43. See the lyrics to the popular patriotic song Love My China, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com (search in search bar for “Love My China” and “lyrics”; then scroll 
down to click “Translate to English” button) (last visited Oct. 26, 2019) (“Fifty-six 
constellations, fifty-six flowers, fifty-six brothers and sisters are a family”). 
 44. Matthew Wills, Tibet and China 65 Years Later, JSTOR DAILY (May 23, 2016), 
https://daily.jstor.org/tibet-and-china-65-years-later/. Tibet is either an “Autonomous 
Region” or a subjugated nation, depending on the political leanings of the claimant. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  
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Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.47 Today, many Tibetans 
feel as though the Han are constricting their autonomy and threatening their 
cultural integrity.48 The Tibetans oppose Beijing’s policies in various ways, 
with perhaps the most famous and most extreme being self-immolation—
with over one hundred acts occurring between 2009 and 2016.49  
The United States is familiar with the situation in Tibet. In 2008, as the 
Olympic Torch crossed the world on its way to Beijing for the Summer 
Games, the route through San Francisco was changed without warning to 
avoid protests against Chinese treatment of Tibet and Tibetans.50 As it turns 
out, the city was wise to avoid the area; shouting matches erupted between 
pro-Beijing and pro-Tibet protestors shouting “Go China, Go China” to 
which the response “Free Tibet, China Out,” was returned.51  
The widely documented disputes between the native Tibetan population 
and the government in Beijing is but a single instance of a larger problem—
the potential for conflict between the Han and the various minority minzu. 
This is not altogether a new concern; indeed “[t]he dissolution of the 
USSR . . . sounded a warning to communist China [who sought] to avoid 
further demands for ethnic identification or alteration, which might cause 
unrest.”52 While the situation in Tibet is quite well known, the conflicts 
between the People’s Republic and its minority population is best illustrated 
today in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. 
Who Are the Uighurs 
The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, or Xinjiang, is a province in 
China’s northwest-most area, bordering Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir.53 Xinjiang is 
a large province that “is a vital component of China’s political and 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id.  
 48. See Edward Wong, Tibetans Fight to Salvage Fading Culture in China, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/world/asia/china-tibet-language-
education.html.  
 49. Wills, supra note 44.  
 50. Maggie Shiels, ‘Houdini Torch’ Relay Disappoints, BBC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7339923.stm. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Wang Linzhu, supra note 14, at 11. 
 53. Matthew Moneyhon, Recent Developments, Controlling Xinjiang: Autonomy on 
China’s “New Frontier”, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 120, 120–21 (2002), http://blog. 
hawaii.edu/aplpj/files/2011/11/APLPJ_03.1_moneyhon.pdf. 
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economic stability.”54 Xinjiang has a long history of economic importance 
in China. At one time, the desert region’s many oases provided the 
lifeblood of the ancient Silk Road; today, the province’s location at the 
crossroads of Central Asia and its status as a gateway into what will soon be 
the world’s largest economy ensure it is a potentially valuable trade 
corridor.55 Xinjiang is also valuable in itself because it “contains huge coal 
and oil reserves, believed to be three times those of the United States.”56 
For these reasons, Xinjiang is a vital territory to the huge and resource-
hungry Chinese economy. Xinjiang is also home to the Uighurs, one of the 
fifty-five recognized minority minzu.57 The Uighurs are a Turkic people 
native to the area and have been empowered by the central government in 
Beijing to create a supposedly autonomous region.58 However, the actual 
autonomy of the province, whose name literally translates to New Frontier, 
may be less than what many Uighurs would like.59  
The Uighurs and the Han are closer to old adversaries than they are old 
friends. This is due largely to the historic pursuit by various incarnations of 
the Chinese to sinicize foreign territories and peoples.60 Historic efforts of 
sinicization began with the once progressive notion that all races had the 
ability to civilize if only they adopted the culture of a civilized people—
specifically, for instance, the Han in China. The Uighurs’ proximity to Han 
power centers ensured they were historically familiar with the Han 
sinicization efforts. For example, in the 600s, Uighur leaders in Xinjiang 
sent representatives to the Emperor of the Sui Dynasty to ask for protection 
from a neighboring state.61 The Uighur state had collapsed shortly before 
this time, and the area was ripe for conquest—both by their neighbors and 
by the more distant Sui.62 The Emperor considered the request very 
seriously because he was eager to expand the Sui; however, he also felt that 
permitting the “barbarians” into the Chinese polity would weaken the state 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 121. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 121–22. 
 59. Id. at 123–24.  
 60. Pamela Kyle Crossley, Thinking About Ethnicity in Early Modern China, LATE 
IMPERIAL CHINA, June 1990, at 1, 2. Here, sinicize means to make Chinese in character or 
form; it is the Chinese equivalent to the term Americanize. 
 61. Shao-yun Yang, Reinventing the Barbarian: Rhetorical and Philosophical Uses of 
the Yi-Di in Mid-Imperial China, 600–1300, at 45 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 
University of California, Berkeley) (on file with author).  
 62. Id.  
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both militarily and culturally.63 The Emperor concluded that the Uighurs 
would be loyal to the Sui Dynasty if the dynasty protected them from their 
neighbors, saying “[w]e have relieved their poverty and provided them with 
sustenance when they were weak. Their gratitude will surely have gone as 
deep as the marrow of their bones.”64 This understanding demonstrates that 
the historic policy of sinicization was believed to first take hold in a 
barbarian culture by affording the barbarians economic advantages and 
incentives. Such a paternalistic approach was commonplace at the time, and 
it was common knowledge that “[b]arbarians, too, are human beings. If they 
are governed with moral power, they can become like members of the 
family.”65 
Despite the Emperor’s hopes, the Uighurs did not respond to his moral 
power. Within a decade of his decision to protect them from their 
neighbors, the Uighurs raided Chinese frontier settlements.66 The Emperor 
was displeased with his revelation, and he said that “[t]he barbarians are 
faithless . . . . After making a covenant with us, they suddenly brought an 
army to trample on our frontier territory. We can take advantage of this 
opportunity to rebuke them for breaking the [previous] agreement . . . .”67 
Even here, the intimate relationship between paternalism and sinicization is 
illustrated as the Emperor rebuked the Uighurs as disobedient children—
rather than confronting them as an invading rival state.  
Eventually, the conflict wore down even the basic assumptions that 
civilization was cultural and not racial, with one of the Emperor’s advisors 
lamenting that the Uighur barbarians “have no regard for gratitude—that is 
their inborn nature.”68 While the statement suggests that the Sui eventually 
determined that civilization was innate, rather than acquired, it is still true 
that it was important to the Chinese state to discuss “civilization” as a trait 
which could be learned. This idea, that even barbarians could be civilized 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 48. 
 65. Id. Here, “moral power” refers to the innate authority the ancient Chinese believed 
was possessed by Emperors so long as they maintained the Mandate of Heaven, a complex 
notion that does not need to be discussed extensively here. Suffice to say that “moral power” 
comes not only from governing justly, but also by upholding traditional cultural practices 
and partaking in many culturally significant religious and social ceremonies native to Han 
conceptualization. Therefore, the phrase “moral power” itself betrays some preference 
toward Han peoples. 
 66. Id. at 53. 
 67. Id. at 54. 
 68. Id. at 59. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss1/4
No. 1] COMMENTS 91 
 
 
through cultural assimilation has been rhetorically central to the interactions 
between the Han and minorities for centuries. 
While the Chinese state has enjoyed substantial control over Xinjiang 
since the Han Dynasty (202 BC–220 AD), the first dynasty to make a 
significant effort to integrate the region was the Great Qing.69 It was the 
storied Emperor Qian Long (1711–1799) who formally incorporated the 
region into the territorial boundaries of the Chinese state and first employed 
the existing political structures in efforts to govern the region.70 This 
consolidation was met with various uprisings against the Chinese, 
perpetrated mostly by Uighur Muslims waging holy wars against the 
foreign infidels.71 Despite Qian Long’s efforts, these rebellions, combined 
with the lack of political will by his successors, ensured that the region was 
never fully incorporated into the Chinese state. Even today, there is a clear 
distinction between Xinjiang and much of the rest of China.72 This cultural 
separation was exasperated after the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and 
the ensuing period of civil war and Japanese invasion. This invasion so 
severely weakened the Chinese hold on Xinjiang that, in 1944, during the 
height of the Chinese Civil War between the Nationalist and Communist 
parties, Xinjiang declared independence and the founding of the East 
Turkestan Republic.73 This Republic was rooted in ethnic nationalism and 
religious fervor but was ultimately short-lived.74 In 1949, shortly after their 
victory in the Civil War, the soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army 
marched into Xinjiang and put an end both to the Republic and to any 
dreams of independence.75 
Initially, Beijing offered these conquered Uighurs promises of autonomy 
and self-determination (an ironic promise to a region it just invaded) in 
hopes that independent minority republics would voluntarily join with the 
People’s Republic in pursuit of strength in unity.76 However, due to the 
machinations of the Soviet Union, Mongolia secured independence, which 
the People’s Republic was forced to recognize, after securing victory in the 
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Civil War.77 This was part of the broader conflicts in the Sino-Soviet 
relationship, which scholars attribute to Stalin’s hesitance to fully embrace 
the People’s Republic because he feared he could not effectively dominate 
Mao.78 Mao feared that this relationship would lead Stalin to sever parts of 
what had formed the Great Qing Dynasty from the People’s Republic so 
that the Soviet Union could more effectively dominate the smaller states.79 
In response, Mao declared that Beijing’s policy toward the Uighurs and the 
other recognized minorities would change—the minority communities 
would be able to retain their language and culture, as well as continue to 
control their own affairs so long as they did not seek to undermine the 
territorial integrity of the People’s Republic.80 In effect, the policy shifted 
from self-determination to the prioritization of the unity of the Chinese 
state.  
Despite Mao’s assurances, major changes were destined to come to 
Xinjiang in the early Communist Period. Shortly after Mao’s change of 
policy, the People’s Republic moved to end the area’s practice of Sharia 
Law and to “disassemble the Islamic court system,” which was one that 
both the Great Qing and the Nationalist had intentionally left undisturbed.81 
The People’s Republic also brought the promised socialist land reform to 
Xinjiang, upending centuries of feudal tradition. Land that had been 
traditionally reserved for ownership and management by the region’s 
religious institutions was incorporated into these programs and redistributed 
to peasants; this cut deeply into the revenue of mosques and religious 
workers who were then forced to rely on charity to continue their work.82 
Additionally, the amount of “cultivated land area nearly doubled between 
1955 and 1960” due to the efforts of government programs.83 While 
Uighurs may have reasonably found the destruction of their traditional 
courts to be offensive, and while the impoverishment of their religious 
institutions was a genuine cause for concern, the Communist Party was not 
entirely set on a course of cultural annihilation.  
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During this same period, the People’s Republic began to record and 
transcribe Uighur music and dance rituals to ensure these customs would be 
preserved.84 At the same time, Beijing devoted funds to the restoration of 
various cultural heritage sites around the region and collected and recorded 
Uighur folklore, while also working with the Uighurs to provide Latin 
scripts for their language.85 Generally, Beijing has attempted to preserve 
aspects of Uighur culture not considered threatening while undermining 
aspects, such as their Islamic faith, which Beijing distrusts. In addition to 
undercutting the religious courts and traditional funding schemes, the 
People’s Republic, during Mao’s Cultural Revolution (a period of general 
upheaval), targeted the Uighur’s Islamic faith was targeted with special 
intensity. During the Cultural Revolution, religion was declared a cultural 
vice in need of abandonment, and as a result, “Islamic practice [became] 
almost impossible. Islamic schooling was gone; mosques were converted to 
party offices; religious texts were confiscated or destroyed; and shrine 
veneration could only be carried out in secret.”86  
Many scholars have alleged this promise of self-government beneath the 
umbrella of the Chinese state was the first insidious step toward returning to 
a policy of sinicization and that “[b]y casting minority integration in 
familial terms and by reneging on the promise of the right to secede, the 
[Chinese Communist Party] paved the way for the creation of autonomous 
minority regions.”87 These regions sought to pacify the potentially volatile 
desires of the minority minzu “by sustaining their own customs, religion, 
language, and limited self-government until the immigration of Han 
Chinese slowly changes the makeup of the population.”88 This theory is not 
without merit related to the historic development of Chinese rule in 
Xinjiang as Han settlement in Xinjiang has proven a consistent focus of the 
People’s Republic. In fact, the Chinese Communist Party annexed Xinjiang 
in 1949. In 1953, Han residents made up 6.1% of the population, and by 
1964, the Han made up 32.9%.89 Not only were Han flooding into Xinjiang, 
but as they arrived, the native resident Uighurs and Kazakhs migrated to the 
Soviet Union and Afghanistan in large numbers.90  
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Resistance to these changes originated in the Maoist Era (1949–1976), 
but the first noteworthy efforts to resist the incoming Han and to undermine 
the gradual assimilation efforts of the Han came in the Deng Era (1978–
1989); this came after the death of Mao and the opening up of the People’s 
Republic under Deng.91 This resistance encouraged Uighurs to rediscover 
their cultural heritage and exploit the new legal and financial framework 
implemented by Deng. These economic reforms led to wealthier 
communities; Xinjiang’s GDP skyrocketed, gaining 139% under Deng.92 
The period also saw local scholars reading, appreciating, and re-
popularizing the works preserved by the earlier efforts of the Communist 
Party, along with new works produced by Uighurs in the Soviet Union.93 
Additionally, the Uighurs migrated back toward their religious roots, and in 
the first decade of the Deng Era, they built thousands of new mosques, 
returned to an Arabic alphabet, reestablished religious educational 
institutions, and were left free to practice their faith, though not as publicly 
as during the Republican Period.94 During this era, the promise made by 
Mao—minimal involvement in cultural affairs at the cost of the ability to 
secede—seemed mostly realized. However, this cultural rebirth was not 
destined to last as shifting desires in Xinjiang and new fears in Beijing 
combined to bring an end to the flourishing period.  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the People’s Republic experienced a 
spirit of protest across the nation, perhaps brought on by Deng’s reforms in 
economics and politics. Xinjiang was not immune to this sweeping spirit, 
most infamously illustrated by the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989.95 In 
the 1980s, protests became more common as the government’s presence 
was lessened. This relaxed government presence resulted in new protests, 
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which occasionally resulted in violence.96 It was also during this period that 
Uighurs, in small but organized numbers, began to call for greater 
autonomy and independence in the formation of a new Islamic State.97 In 
1990, Uighurs assembled in the village of Baren and “chanted Islamic 
slogans and later attacked police with firearms and homemade bombs.”98 
This was in the wake of the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, which 
devolved into the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Deng Xiaoping had already 
demonstrated that political liberation should only be tolerated to a point. In 
many ways, Deng’s philosophy, therefore, did not represent an actual 
change from Mao’s, but, instead, moved the limits of tolerability. Those 
who threatened the integrity, sovereignty, and security of the state were still 
subject to extreme, violent repression in the Deng Era. Beijing’s concerns 
were only heightened and vindicated in the wake of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, their model for minority autonomous regions.99 Following 
the Tiananmen Square Protests, combined with the other protests ongoing 
across the People’s Republic and abroad, the Communist Party concluded 
that the “religious revival [in Xinjiang] threatened Chinese Communist 
Party control of Xinjiang.”100 This determination proved determinative for 
future relations between Beijing and Xinjiang.  
After the Baren protests, the Communist Party responded with sanctions 
directly aimed at the resurgent religious institutions. The construction of 
new mosques was halted or slowed, and the religious education that had 
begun to flourish was curtailed.101 The efforts to end these new social 
movements resulted in the Uighurs being all the more determined to pursue 
them. The Uighurs continued to reincorporate their traditional culture, 
especially secular aspects, into their daily lives.102 Additionally, the Uighurs 
imported foreign ideas of Islamic piety and generally became more 
religious in the wake of the People’s Republic’s efforts.103 Conflict became 
inevitable as Beijing attempted to hasten the Uighur assimilation and the 
Uighurs attempted to distance themselves from the Han dominated 
Communist Party. Throughout the 1990s, the protests that had been 
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ongoing since the mid to late 1980s were suddenly coupled with regular 
“riots, bombings and assassinations.”104  
By the early 2000s, the People’s Republic was facing a significant 
problem. A little known Muslim minority existing in the energy-rich 
periphery of the Chinese state was resorting to extremist efforts to 
accomplish its separatist ideas and pursue its own political agenda with 
violence, often directed against the Han civilian population in the region. 
On September 11, 2001, Muslim hijackers associated with Al Qaeda 
attacked the United States in the largest and most costly terrorist attack in 
American history. In response, President George W. Bush declared, “A 
great people has been moved to defend a great nation. . . . Our military is 
powerful, and it’s prepared. . . . America and our friends and allies join with 
all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together 
to win the war against terrorism.”105 The People’s Republic positioned itself 
among America’s friends and aligned with the United States on the issue of 
fighting terrorism. This alliance resulted in the People’s Republic taking an 
aggressive new role in Xinjiang and framing their actions to force the 
Uighur population into submission as part of an international war against 
terrorism.106  
Presently, most violence in Xinjiang is either unorganized or loosely 
organized at best, and it typically takes the form of attacks against state 
representatives, party officers, and police stations due to grievances, which 
are ultimately local concerns.107 However, the less frequent—but more 
organized—attacks are widely known. In 2014, Uighur separatists attacked 
the Kunming train station with knives, resulting in the deaths of thirty-one 
civilians and four Uighur attackers.108 This onslaught garnered national and 
international attention and condemnation.109 The People’s Republic’s 
response to this period of violence has focused on increasing the presence 
of security forces in the region and the amount of Han in the area.  
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Beijing has admitted that since 1999, their goal has been “to adjust the 
proportions of the populations of different ethnic groups in Xinjiang.”110 
Today, the Han make up approximately 40% of the total population of 
Xinjiang.111 Additionally, economic development has increasingly 
benefitted the new Han settlers, rather than the indigenous Uighurs. For 
instance, Uighurs have been effectively pushed out of now Han-dominated 
metropolitan areas, with 98% of Han in Xinjiang living in urban centers and 
90% of Uighurs living in rural areas.112 Even so, the few Uighurs who still 
reside in major cities are “confined to poor, ghetto-like communities . . . in 
the shadow of new high-rise office buildings.”113 This introduces an urban-
rural element to complicate the already tenuous cultural relationship. While 
the Uighur have become more devout to their Muslim faith, the Han tend to 
be secular, and neither group is generally able to speak the other’s 
language.114 The increasing tension, coupled with the growing volume of 
Han in the region, resulted in violent riots in the city of Urumqi in 2009.115 
The Urumqi Riots began as peaceful protests before devolving into violent 
riots where Uighurs killed Han settlers indiscriminately; the Han responded 
in kind.116 In response, the People’s Armed Police entered the region and 
established checkpoints and guard stations, while the city of Urumqi was 
effectively shut down.117 The internet across Xinjiang no longer functioned, 
and the Uighurs outside the city were forced to obtain travel passes to move 
about the province.118  
What Is Happening to the Uighurs  
The People’s Republic has always framed government efforts as 
“campaigns.” The Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution are two 
such campaigns. The most noteworthy campaign impacting Han-Uighur 
relations in Xinjiang is the Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism, or the 
Strike Hard Campaign.119 The Strike Hard Campaign focused on deploying 
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military or paramilitary forces to Xinjiang and “tightening restrictions on 
cultural expression and religious practice.”120 Because of historical 
tensions, this campaign has caused Uighurs to fear that the Communist 
Party’s “ultimate goal is to overrun their homeland, outlaw their Muslim 
faith, and erase their cultural distinctiveness altogether.”121 While the Strike 
Hard Campaign initially began in the late 1990s as part of the response to 
violent resistance in Xinjiang, it was reinvigorated in the wake of the 
September 11 attacks, and it is the foundation of Communist Party actions 
in the region today.122  
The Strike Hard Campaign is an aggressive assault on Uighur cultural 
heritage. Local authorities acting under the guidance of the Campaign have 
taken to “burning Uighur historical literature, imprisoning Uighur authors, 
banning traditional music with Muslim references, and forbidding 
instruction in the Uighur language at Xinjiang University.”123 This has been 
justified as an effort to destroy literature promoting separatist ideas and to 
punish the people who created it; however, the Campaign seems to interpret 
everything acknowledging a separate Uighur identity as promoting 
separatist ideas.124 Another key feature of the Strike Hard Campaign is to 
disrupt the practice of illegal religious activities and to undermine the 
extremist religious forces in the area.125 This practice has resulted in the 
closure of illegal religious centers and the arrest of numerous individuals.126 
The state has also acted against those who translate the Quran into Uighur, 
accusing them of preaching separatism.127  
The People’s Republic has also made it more difficult for Uighur 
Muslims to live out their faith. For instance, as part of the Campaign, 
fasting was outlawed in schools and government offices, and students were 
instructed to break their fasts.128 The Campaign also targeted the heart of 
the religion by mandating that all imams must attend compulsory political 
education classes to provide them with “a clearer understanding of the 
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party’s ethnic and religious policies.”129 This notion extends naturally from 
another Campaign push that prohibited worship outside of government-
sanctioned mosques, which were operated by government-approved 
organizations and staffed by government-recognized imams.130 Further, 
these imams were not permitted to criticize government policies.131 While 
many Uighurs do accept these institutions as a part of life, many others 
reject them for not being truly representative of the faith.132 Ironically, the 
atheist Communist Party rejects alternatives as not only illegal, but also 
heretical institutions.133 The Campaign has called on Uighur Party members 
to reject Islam even more fiercely than the general public.  
There is no distinction in the People’s Republic between the government 
and the party, and the few Uighurs in government or in the Communist 
Party are forbidden from attending religious festivals or ceremonies without 
first seeking permission from their supervisors, followed by a subsequent 
report.134 This requirement is a safeguard in addition to the structural 
systems designed to keep the religious from holding membership in the 
party. As the Communist Party is officially atheist, it is impossible to join 
the party and adhere to any religion, including Islam.135 This notion has 
been enforced by consistently removing Muslims who have found their way 
into the party from membership.136 Party membership is a significant 
advantage in the People’s Republic; not only does it enable one to work for 
the massive state infrastructure in more lucrative positions, but it also 
unlocks many social advantages. However, Uighurs are effectively 
forbidden from enjoying any of these benefits unless they forsake their 
faith, something many are unwilling to do. These harsh policies have 
encouraged Uighurs to immigrate abroad—many to Afghanistan—in an 
effort to practice their faith, where they then become involved in militant 
Islam and later bring those attitudes back to Xinjiang.137 
In 2018, the Communist Party resolved to advance the “cultural 
protection and development” of Xinjiang and to end the long simmering 
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conflict with decisive action.138 In a November 2018 whitepaper published 
by the People’s Republic State Council Information Office, the party noted 
that it had “worked to modernize ethnic cultures,” and that it had always 
“respected [the Uighur’s] freedom of religious belief.”139 This benevolence, 
the party clarified, was rooted in the maxim that the ethnic cultures of 
minority minzu “make up an inseparable part of the Chinese culture.”140 
However, the Party stated that this does not mean that the Uighurs are free 
to practice their culture, especially their faith, without interference. Indeed, 
“[a]dapting to local society is essential for the survival and development of 
any religion . . . . Religious circles in Xinjiang are encouraged to promote 
social harmony and development as well as cultural progress . . . .”141 This 
promotion is executed by searching for principals and tenants in a particular 
faith—Islam, for instance—who can “contribute to China’s development 
and conform to China’s traditions.”142 
In a self-described attempt to protect the valuable cultural heritage of 
Xinjiang, the Communist Party has forced over a million ethnic Uighurs 
into camps for reeducation.143 The policy behind this seems to be that 
Uighurs are entitled to cultural protection, which extremism endangers; 
thus, the party has imprisoned an estimated 11.5% of the Muslim 
population of Xinjiang between the ages of twenty and seventy-nine.144 
Initially, the party denied the existence of these facilities, but as evidence 
continued to mount, they conceded and admitted that they had opened a 
number of “vocational training centers” where “trainees” learn job skills 
and lead “colorful lives.”145 In the few instances where China has offered 
looks inside these camps, they show Uighurs who have renounced their 
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faith and now are working in the camps as factory workers.146 The party is 
proud to provide jobs for these detained people, as it seeks to forge the 
Uighurs into “a disciplined, Chinese-speaking industrial work force, loyal 
to the Communist Party,” according to officials.147 The same officials also 
outlined in reports that the camps would produce clothing that would then 
be sold in stores across the People’s Republic and that inmates may be 
expected to continue working at these facilities even after they are released 
from the camps.148 
These camps seem to be part of the tradition of the old re-education 
through labor camps that were popular during the Cultural Revolution; 
these camps saw intellectuals and the socially and politically elite who were 
forced to move to the countryside to farm with the peasants so they could 
better understand Mao Zedong Thought.149 In an interview, the Governor of 
Xinjiang stated that “[t]he purpose of [the camps] is to fundamentally 
eliminate the environment and soil that breeds terrorism and religious 
extremism and eliminate the terrorism activities before they take place.”150 
Detainees are required to learn Mandarin and are also instructed “to accept 
modern science and enhance their understanding of Chinese history and 
culture.”151 Presumably, this includes understanding how Uighur culture 
properly fits into the grander framework of Chinese culture. The governor 
also marshalled graduates from these facilities to offer their insights. One 
woman said that “[t]he government didn’t give up on me. It has actively 
saved and assisted me, giving me free food, accommodation and education. 
I will cherish this opportunity and become a person useful to the country 
and society.”152 Additionally, the governor insisted that those who 
underwent the educational training purged themselves of “extremist 
thought” through activities such as art and sports and left the facilities with 
“notably enhanced national consciousness.”153  
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Interviews with Uighurs who no longer live in China have painted a 
starkly different picture. According to Uighurs, even small actions can 
result in a sentence at one of these camps. Suspicious behaviors include 
having a beard, abstaining from alcohol or cigarettes, grieving publicly 
when one’s parents die, refusing to attend public struggle sessions,154 
refusing to denounce yourself or members of your family at said sessions, 
owning a compass, complaining about local officials, or knowing or being 
related to someone who has done any of the suspicious activities.155 Once 
imprisoned, the experience can become brutal. One inmate described being 
restrained to a chair so that he was immobilized, prevented from sleeping, 
beaten with batons, and stabbed with needles.156 The inmate also described 
being forced to share a room with forty-five other detainees and said there 
was so little room they were forced to sleep in shifts.157 Other eyewitnesses 
say that detainees are forced to sing propaganda songs, and if they refuse, 
they are not fed.158 Others report being interrogated for extensive periods, 
as long as three days, prior to being sent to the facilities.159 Inmates are 
expected to condemn the three evil forces of separatism, extremism, and 
terrorism, and “if you couldn’t recite [songs and slogans, the guards] 
wouldn’t allow you to eat, sleep, or sit.”160 Additionally, inmates were often 
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fed pork and forced to drink alcohol if they were suspected of being 
religious extremists.161  
The plight of the Uighurs may cause one to reasonably wonder whether 
the Communist Party has actually moved away at all from their ancient 
strategies employed by the dynasties against “foreign barbarians.” Recall 
the Sui Dynasty Emperor considering whether or not to admit the Uighurs 
into the protection of the Dynasty. He and his court were confident that if 
they extended economic wealth to the Uighurs, then they would repay the 
Han with immense loyalty. When loyalty failed to manifest, he then 
rebuked the Uighurs. He even questioned whether the entire project was 
unnecessary as perhaps treachery was the Uighurs’ inborn nature.  
There are substantial parallels between that story and the present 
challenges faced by the Uighurs. The Communist Party moved into 
Xinjiang initially with hopes that the Uighurs would join them voluntarily 
in the socialist struggle. To encourage loyalty to the state, the Communist 
Party invested heavily in the region, and the economy has improved 
substantially under the administration of the People’s Republic (though 
perhaps not as fast as the Han-dominated coastal regions). However, the 
Communist Party, much like the Sui Emperor, was rebuffed and the loyalty, 
or willing assimilation, they anticipated did not materialize. Instead, both 
the Communist Party and the Sui Emperor felt attacked for their generosity. 
The party, as well as the Emperor, resolved to rebuke the Uighurs, and 
while the Emperor did so with military force, the party has done so with 
large-scale incarceration and even more violently forced assimilation. 
While there are certainly substantial divergences between the Communist 
Party and the Sui Dynasty and their experiences, it is difficult to ignore the 
somewhat cyclical nature of the present dispute in Xinjiang.  
The ongoing actions of the People’s Republic toward the Uighurs are 
cruel and unacceptable. However, when it comes to what can be done, we 
may find that options are quite limited, especially domestically. The 
People’s Republic claims to be a nation built on the rule of law; however, 
their legal principals allow for a great deal to be done in the name of 
preserving the integrity and sovereignty of the state. An examination of the 
development of Chinese law affecting indigenous peoples demonstrates 
how their historically robust protections have been consistently weakened 
by the Communist Party’s rulership, creating the current situation in 
Xinjiang. 
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The Jiangxi Soviet 
The origin of the Communist Party’s minority minzu laws trace their way 
back to the Chinese Civil War, when the Communist Party was little more 
than a band of guerrilla fighters attempting revolution. In 1927, the 
Communist and Nationalist parties agreed to a momentary truce, setting 
aside their ideological differences to come together as Chinese people and 
resist the invasion of the Japanese Empire.162 However, this alliance was 
not destined to last; during a brief lull in hostilities against Japan, the 
Nationalists saw an opportunity to exterminate the Communists and ensure 
their continued governance over China if the Japanese did not prevail in the 
parallel conflict.163 Jiang Jieshi, leader of the Nationalist party, acted on this 
opportunity and on April 12, 1927, ordered Nationalist troops to ambush 
their unsuspecting communist allies.164 The Communists were attacked 
across the nation, centering in Shanghai, and suffered immense casualties, 
with as many as 5000 missing, many presumed dead.165 This betrayal 
forced the Communist Party to evacuate from the urban centers, which were 
controlled either by the Nationalist or the Japanese, and retreat into the 
mountainous countryside as the Civil War resumed in earnest. The 
Communist Party established a defensible position in the rural Jiangxi 
Province and began to regroup there. It was during this period that the 
Communist Party first turned its attention to the issue of indigenous 
peoples’ rights.166 
The Constitution of the Jiangxi Soviet was the first document the 
Communist Party endorsed as a model of what government would look like 
in a then-hypothetical People’s Republic of China.167 However, the 
document was prepared during a time of conflict when the Communist and 
Nationalist parties both offered competing ideas for what the future of the 
Chinese state could and should be. For this reason, the Constitution was as 
much as a platform as it was a legal document. The Communist Party hoped 
that Constitution’s progressive nature would encourage people across the 
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country to rally to their cause. Specifically, the Communist Party was aware 
that the Nationalist’s grasp on the periphery of the country—including 
Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang—as especially tenuous. Therefore, if the 
Communist Party could earn the loyalty of these minority groups far from 
the center, its numbers would not only be replenished but would, for the 
first time, make significant territorial gains against the Nationalists. This 
would pinch the Nationalists between the Communists in the west and the 
Japanese coast. Mao, one of the leaders of the Jiangxi Soviet, was explicit 
that his ambition was to attract the minorities of China to his cause by 
offering them extensive rights under Communist rule.168  
The Jiangxi Constitution provides “[t]he Soviet government of China 
recognizes the right of self-determination of the national minorities in 
China, their right to complete separation from China and the formation of 
an independent state for each national minority.”169 This is a profound 
promise. As has been established, both Xinjiang and Tibet presently have 
noteworthy populations desiring freedom from the governance of the 
People’s Republic, and both regions certainly could benefit from such 
generous language. During the Jiangxi Soviet Era, the Communist Party 
attempted to portray itself as the ultimate ally to minority groups across the 
country, and promises of “complete separation” and “independent states” 
were an excellent strategy for such an endeavor. Of course, today the 
Communist Party considers separatism to be one of the “three evils” 
Uighurs are forced to denounce, but this would not be so had the Jiangxi 
Soviet been adopted into the People’s Republic, as the party initially said it 
would be. The Jiangxi Constitution also stated the People’s Republic would 
“encourage the development of national culture and of the respective 
national languages of these peoples.”170 This statement is another ironic 
promise given that, today, the use of the Uighur native language may be 
grounds to send individuals to internment camps for reeducation and to 
learn Mandarin. The promises enshrined in Article 14 make the Jiangxi 
Constitution one of the most progressive documents ever drafted in the 
realm of indigenous peoples’ rights, surpassing even the United Nations’ 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Of course, it is easier to 
make promises than to act on them.  
The Jiangxi Soviet’s constitution endured even as the Communists fled 
Jiangxi because of the advancing Nationalists. However, after World War 
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II, the Communists abandoned political philosophizing to resume full-scale 
hostilities against the Nationalists. Eventually, the Communist Party 
prevailed over its Nationalist foes and forced Jiang’s party to retreat to 
Taiwan in 1949.171 In the same year, the Communist Party consolidated its 
control over the state’s periphery.172 Still, the Jiangxi Soviet had not made 
minority nations eager to submit to the Communist Party or join the 
People’s Republic, even with the promise of eventual self-determination. 
The People’s Republic brought both Tibet and Xinjiang into the state only 
after invasion and conquest.173  
The advent of the Communist Party brought with it benefits and 
detriments to Xinjiang. While arable land was expanded and the economy 
grew explosively in the early Maoist Period, there were also large influxes 
of ethnic Han into the area.174 Today, the Uighurs make up only 45% of the 
population, while the Han make up 40%—the effect of decades of 
relocation policies.175 The Maoist Period also brought with it the Great 
Leap Forward, the Korean War, and the Cultural Revolution, all of which 
were disasters for the People’s Republic. Xinjiang was equally affected by 
the resulting famines and mass starvation.176 While the Uighurs were not 
necessarily fond of the Maoist Period, there do not seem to have been major 
protests, though this may have been due to the tight control the government 
had over the people. However, it does seem that during this period “the 
Uighurs began to feel marginalized in their own land, and viewed the 
increasing integration with China as a threat to their cultural survival.”177 
These feelings would be vindicated following the response of the People’s 
Republic to the Uighurs’ cultural renaissance in the Deng Period.  
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Initially, even though the Jiangxi Soviet’s Constitution had not been 
adopted by the People’s Republic and a new Constitution was still being 
drafted, the Uighurs enjoyed some of the freedoms they were promised by 
the old constitution. Prior to the Cultural Revolution’s efforts to purge 
religion, the Uighurs were “entitled to practice their religion unhindered, for 
it was part of their ‘national culture.’”178 While this freedom to practice was 
limited, the Uighurs seemed generally satisfied with the arrangement. 
Nevertheless, the Cultural Revolution would soon sweep over the nation, 
including in Xinjiang. During the Revolution, religious belief would be 
declared a societal sickness in need of annihilation.179 The Uighurs, 
therefore, experienced two great betrayals between the end of the Second 
World War and the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. The first came 
when the People’s Republic abandoned its promise of self-determination 
and invaded Xinjiang, forcibly annexing the region. The second came 
during the Cultural Revolution, when the rights of the Uighurs to practice 
their faith was rescinded. These two events demonstrate the fading 
promises of Jiangxi and the coming reality of Communist Party rule in 
Xinjiang.  
The Jiangxi Soviet’s Constitution was an aspirational model the rest of 
the world could look toward insofar as its promises to indigenous people; 
however, the Communist Party rejected it shortly after taking control of 
mainland China. Instead of modifying the Jiangxi Soviet so that it could 
retain the spirit of many of its foundational principles, the Communist Party 
resolved to build an entirely new Constitution for its entirely new country. 
The new Constitution of the People’s Republic would extinguish the last 
embers of the Jiangxi Soviet’s Constitution, replacing Jiangxi’s limitless 
promises with contingent assurances that individuals’ rights would be 
upheld so long as they do not too greatly interfere with assimilation. When 
the Communist Party drafted the Jiangxi Constitution, they were focused on 
winning a war, but when they drafted the People’s Republic’s Constitution, 
they were focused on building a powerful, unified state. 
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Present Constitution  
The People’s Republic of China’s Constitution is very long, comprised 
of four chapters and 138 articles.180 While the American Constitution exists 
mostly as a series of principles, which are ultimately somewhat vague and 
in need of interpretation, the Constitution of the People’s Republic aims to 
effectively answer almost any question that may be raised. In fact, 
Americans may say that the Chinese Constitution is more akin to the United 
States Code than to the United States Constitution.  
In its earliest passages, the Chinese Constitution asserts “[t]he State 
respects and protects human rights.”181 However, the Chinese Constitution 
does not place the entirety of this responsibility on the state alone, but it 
also admonishes the people to do their part for the safety of the state. 
Specifically, the Constitution states that “[e]very citizen is entitled to the 
rights and at the same time must perform the duties prescribed by the 
Constitution and other laws.”182 The consequences of this are clear—the 
Chinese people are entitled to human rights, or, at least, human rights as 
defined by China. The Chinese Communist Party can therefore legally 
shun, curtail, or limit rights either within the Constitution itself or through 
supplementary legislation.  
The government’s ability to limit the definition of human rights is 
especially clear in the realm of religion. Citizens “enjoy the freedom of 
religious belief” and may not be compelled “to believe in, or not to believe 
in, any religion: nor may [the State] discriminate against citizens who 
believe in, or do not believe in, any religion.”183 Yet, the State only 
“protects normal religious activities,” and these are activities which do not 
“disrupt the public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the 
educational system of the State.”184 The Communist Party has interpreted 
the “normal religious activities” clause to apply only to state-recognized 
churches. For this reason, the Uighurs must worship at mosques approved 
by the state, just as Christians must worship at either the state-sanctioned 
Catholic or Protestant associations. Any worship outside these contexts falls 
outside the normal religious practices constitutionally protected.  
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Additionally, religions in China are “not [to be] subject to any foreign 
domination.”185 The result of this full article is to give Chinese citizens the 
freedom of religion but only insofar as the State is prepared to tolerate it; 
where there is a rational reason to believe that a particular religious 
practice, or even religion, undermines one of the three government 
interests, or alternatively where the religion is too heavily influenced by 
foreigners, the State can and will crack down on its practice. In fact, the 
Constitution later explicitly states, “Citizens of the People’s Republic of 
China, in exercising their freedoms and rights, may not infringe upon the 
interests of the State, of society or of the collective . . . .”186 This sentence 
clearly communicates what the other articles suggested implicitly—the 
rights of the people are subservient to the rights of the State. Such a notion 
provides a fundamental foundation for understanding how Chinese law 
interprets human rights and how that interpretation will affect China’s 
views on the rights of indigenous peoples.  
The Chinese Constitution sharply departs from the language used by the 
preceding Jiangxi Constitution on the matter of China’s nationalities. The 
Jiangxi Constitution assured the nationalities that “[t]he Soviet government 
of China recognizes the right of self-determination of the national 
minorities in China, their right to complete separation from China, and the 
formation of an independent state for each national minority.”187 The 
Chinese Constitution, on the other hand, aggressively did away with any 
promises of self-determination or the complete separation previously 
guaranteed. In place of these promises, the Chinese Constitution declared 
that “[i]t is the duty of the citizens of the People’s Republic of China to 
safeguard the unification of the country and the unity of all its 
nationalities.”188 The Uighurs, like all other nationalities in China, went 
from having the guarantee of self-determination and, if desired, 
independence under the old Jiangxi Constitution to suddenly having a duty 
to advance and maintain their integration with the Chinese central state.  
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The new Constitution recognized that indigenous populations may be 
unwilling to trade self-determination for complete incorporation, and 
therefore, offered an olive branch in the form of the autonomous regions. 
They were assured that these regions would be led by representatives of the 
same nationality as those governed and would “independently administer 
educational, scientific, cultural, public health and physical culture affairs in 
their respective areas . . . .”189 So, the new Constitution seemed to suggest 
that the local populations can still govern issues of local concern without 
outside interference, but international relations and economic decisions 
would still be made in conjunction with the interests of the State.190 Further, 
local regions were free to “employ the spoken and written language or 
languages in common use in the locality.”191 While this may initially sound 
like a fair, even if unsatisfying arrangement, the Constitution becomes 
significantly less friendly toward the rights of minorities in the last article 
of the section, and it does so quietly. It notes that one of the obligations of 
the State is to provide “financial, material, and technical assistance to the 
minority nationalities to help accelerate their economic and cultural 
development.”192 This is the supreme law of the land in China and therefore 
acts as a suitable frame for discussion about how the law in mainland China 
has evolved and what this evolution means for the rights of indigenous 
peoples. 
Recent Legal Changes 
When the existence of the vast internment camps first became widely 
known to the global public, the People’s Republic denied their existence.193 
However, the evidence of the camps’ existence continued to accumulate 
and eventually forced Beijing to acknowledge their existence. After their 
acknowledgement, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region moved to 
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enact legislation legitimizing the camps. Xinjiang had previously possessed 
legislation outlining how the government could respond to terrorism as a 
result of the Strike Hard Campaign; nonetheless, in the wake of 
international outcry against the camps, they amended the regulation to 
acknowledge and endorse the camps. The revisions state that 
“[g]overnments at the county level and above can set up education and 
transformation organizations and supervising departments such as 
vocational training centers, to educate and transform people who have been 
influenced by extremism.”194 This revision was designed to address 
specifically the complaints that the People’s Republic had been acting 
without legal authorization. The previous version of the law had identified 
numerous “manifestations of extremism” including many of things 
characteristic of Uighurs, such as “having ‘abnormal beards,’ refusing to 
watch television or listen to radio, and preventing children from receiving 
national education.”195 
Despite the changing law, many observers have rejected the legal 
authorization and have asserted that “international human rights law is 
clear, no matter how much China tries to ‘legalize’ the impermissible.”196 
Others have gone even further, asserting that “[w]hat the Chinese 
(government) is doing is illegal on every front: under international law, 
under their own constitution, under criminal procedures, [and under] 
autonomy law.”197 Others have pointed to China’s counter-terrorism law 
which permits a maximum of fifteen days detention without charge, which 
the camps have routinely exceeded.198 
Still, an examination of these claims in light of the Constitution of the 
People’s Republic will quickly demonstrate that these actions are legal 
under Chinese law. Firstly, it is the duty of the People’s Republic to ensure 
that separatism does not have room to grow in the country and that nothing 
jeopardizes the unity of the various minzu. It is also clear that the rights of 
the citizenry are subservient to these ends. The Constitution expressly states 
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that “[i]t is the duty of citizens of the People’s Republic of China to 
safeguard the unification of the country and the unity of all its 
nationalities.”199 This duty imposes an obligation on the citizens to advance 
the principles of unity. The state has the obligation to “combat local 
national chauvinism” and “do its utmost to promote the common prosperity 
of all the nationalities.”200 This language empowers the state to determine 
what policies must be pursued to promote the common prosperity of the 
various minzu and then confer the obligation to pursue that policy to the 
people. Likewise, the people do not have a right to practice religion freely 
but only the ability to practice normal religions and only then when they do 
not “disrupt public order,” which is another determination Beijing is 
empowered to make.201 Citizens do enjoy freedom from arrest “except with 
the approval or by decision of a people’s procuratorate or by decision of a 
people’s court.”202 That said, procuratorates are themselves appointed at the 
local level.203 For this reason, we can conclude that the legal change does 
authorize the arrests and that the People’s Republic could reasonably draw 
a distinction between arrest and detainment.  
These conclusions are not surprising. The Constitution of the People’s 
Republic places the authority of the state-the peoples’ democratic 
dictatorship-in a position of paramount importance. The rights of the people 
exist but are ultimately subservient to the state, and the state is tasked with 
ensuring the territorial integrity of the People’s Republic almost above all 
other things. Thus, it is only natural that the People’s Republic would have 
the legal authority under Chinese law to erect these camps and wage this 
war of cultural annihilation, especially because it is in the name of 
mitigating separatist efforts.  
International Response to Xinjiang 
The international community has been surprisingly vocal about the 
situation in Xinjiang; yet, these numerous complaints have not materialized 
into any action. Alongside the standard outcry by international human 
rights organizations, there have been several statements by prominent 
politicians around the world criticizing Beijing for their policies in Xinjiang 
and calling on the People’s Republic to bring their actions against the 
                                                                                                                 
 199. XIANFA art. 52 (1982) (China). 
 200. XIANFA pmbl. (1982) (China)  
 201. XIANFA art. 36 (1982) (China).  
 202. XIANFA art. 37 (1982) (China).  
 203. XIANFA art. 101 (1982) (China).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss1/4
No. 1] COMMENTS 113 
 
 
Uighurs there. In April 2018, Senator Marco Rubio and Congressman Chris 
Smith urged the American Ambassador to China, Terry Branstad, to call for 
an investigation of Beijing’s actions in Xinjiang.204 This effort has not yet 
materialized into any actual action. In May, when the People’s Republic 
prevented President Dolkun Isa of the World Uyghur Congress, a 
government-in-exile group calling for the independence of Xinjiang, from 
speaking before a United Nations conference on indigenous peoples’ rights, 
United States representative Kelley Currie complained that the Chinese 
were unfairly keeping Mr. Isa from speaking.205 Mr. Isa was eventually 
permitted into the United Nations building on his third attempt after being 
escorted out twice previously at China’s urging.206  
United States Vice President Mike Pence lamented the internment of the 
Uighurs while speaking at a religious freedom conference in July of 
2018.207 Still, the Vice President devoted only forty of the speech’s 3500 
words to the issue of Xinjiang.208 Additionally, Muslim leaders around the 
world have been even less engaged with the issue and “[n]o Muslim 
nation’s head of state has made a public statement in support of the Uighurs 
this decade.”209 Senator Marco Rubio, this time aided by sixteen other 
Congressmen, attempted again in August to push the United States to take 
action against China and calling for the United States to impose sanctions 
against ranking Communist Party leaders in Xinjiang.210 This request was 
not acted upon.  
That the United States has not taken meaningful action against the 
People’s Republic for their actions in Xinjiang should not be surprising. 
Even if not for the fact that the United States is currently headed by an 
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administration not especially interested in conflict over human rights, the 
United States would still be hesitant to engage the People’s Republic.211 
Benito Mussolini is attributed with having said “[t]he League [of Nations] 
is very well when sparrows shout, but no good at all when eagles fall 
out.”212 He was conveying the idea that international agreements and 
organizations are more adept at corralling and punishing smaller states than 
they are at doing the same against great powers. This is an astute 
observation. As was pointed out, Muslim nations’ heads of state have not 
condemned China’s actions in Xinjiang, and this is because “[m]any 
Muslim governments have strengthened their relationship with China or 
even gone out of their way to support China’s persecution.”213 This is a 
natural consequence of the People’s Republic potent economic might. It is 
difficult to muster the political will to confront such a powerful state that 
indisputably makes a more profitable friend than adversary.  
The Role of Indigenous Peoples’ Law 
Indigenous peoples’ law may not help the Uighurs. It is conceivable, if 
not likely, that even should the world suddenly view the entire struggle of 
the Uighur people through the lens of indigenous people law, that nothing 
about China’s actions toward Xinjiang would change. There is no reason to 
believe that they would do anything other than ignore the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Nevertheless, that does 
not mean that there is no value in reconsidering who the world should 
classify as indigenous and tearing down the distinctions between 
indigenous and native peoples, as proposed by Counsellor Yao.  
Counsellor Yao put forward, in his speech honoring the anniversary of 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, that 
there was a distinction between indigenous and native populations. He 
contended that not all countries have indigenous peoples and that 
indigenous peoples are uniquely tied to Western colonial history. Largely, 
the world seems to agree with him, which is why the states that most 
resisted the Declaration were those Western states with bloody colonial 
pasts. Even so, there is no need for this distinction.  
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The Uighurs of Xinjiang are clearly an indigenous population by any fair 
definition of the word. Further, the stereotypical indigenous peoples would 
no doubt look at the current situation in Xinjiang-as Beijing attempts to 
force out their religion, language, and culture, and seeks to forcibly 
assimilate them into the cultural majority-and would not see painful 
reminders of their own pasts. The cultural extermination ongoing in 
Xinjiang and Tibet are of precisely the kind that efforts like the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was drafted to 
address. Catastrophes are inevitable when a cultural minority is governed 
by an unrestrained majority. We have seen this story before in the United 
States. We will see it again elsewhere. And while it is true that it does not 
matter how the world labels China’s actions in Xinjiang, there is no reason 
that crimes against indigenous communities should sting more than crimes 
against human rights; the mistake lays in focusing on what Mussolini would 
call the eagles and not the sparrows.  
The People’s Republic of China is a massive economy and an emerging 
superpower, but they are unique in this role. The vast majority of 
indigenous peoples, defined in a way that does not draw distinctions 
between indigenous and native as Counsellor Yao does, are more akin to 
sparrows than they are to eagles. The world believes there is value in 
recognizing the specific rights and interests of indigenous communities—if 
it did not there would be no need for specific declarations and organizations 
concerning them—and the world should therefore not shy away from 
applying the label “indigenous peoples” broadly. There is no reason that an 
individual should hear the word indigenous and think more quickly of New 
Zealand than Tibet. And there is no reason why expanding the world’s 
understanding of indigenous peoples should necessarily harm the interests 
and ambitions of those groups presently recognized as such. And perhaps 
broadening the coalition of indigenous peoples could itself have intrinsic 
benefits for those communities and humanity more broadly.  
Conclusion 
At present, there are approximately one million men and women being 
unjustly held in internment camps in China’s far western region of 
Xinjiang. This represents the cumulation of decades, or perhaps even 
centuries, of assimilation-oriented policies by the Han toward minorities in 
general and Uighurs specifically. The People’s Republic has relied on 
creative interpretations of what groups constitute indigenous peoples to 
sidestep the issue and assert that there are no indigenous people in the 
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People’s Republic of China. This is an absurd claim given the vast ethnic 
diversity the People’s Republic boasts of. While the People’s Republic is 
likely protected from feeling actual consequences for their mass interment 
policies due to their substantial power on the world stage, and thus there is 
likely little that one can reasonably expect to be done for the Uighurs to 
mitigate their present plight, there is value in using the Uighurs to better 
understand that the struggles endured by indigenous and native populations 
are substantially similar. It is possible that correcting our understanding of 
the term could assist the world in confronting other states who, like China, 
do have indigenous peoples not traditionally thought of as such, and who 
are acting against them in ways rising to the level of cultural genocide. This 
is itself sufficient cause to seek a realignment of our understanding of 
indigenous people to a more inclusive standard. 
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